Young and inexperienced counselors at Camp Mystic were not trained to help campers during floods or other emergencies before a July Fourth flood swept through the all-girls Christian camp in the Texas Hill Country, a Texas legislative committee’s investigator told lawmakers Monday. Casey Garrett described a camp culture in which teenage counselors, including those placed in the hardest-hit cabins, were ill-prepared for the crisis that killed 25 campers and two teenage counselors, along with camp owner Richard Eastland as he tried to evacuate girls to higher ground.
Garrett told the committee that Camp Mystic’s response failures went beyond a single mistake and instead reflected a broader pattern that included what she described as an “obedience” culture, flood-warning complacency, poor communications, and delayed evacuation. She said the investigator’s findings came from interviews with about 150 people, including campers and counselors, the Eastland family and victims’ families, and were presented in a “stark, streamlined review” of the days and moments surrounding the flood. A written report of findings is expected later this year.
Garrett’s testimony described survivors’ accounts of how the flood struck and how quickly people tried to react. She told lawmakers that one girl reported being swept more than 6 miles downriver, describing being sucked underwater multiple times before washing up on a debris pile and falling asleep; she said the girl was rescued the next morning by two women who heard her cries. Another survivor, Garrett said, recalled floodwaters rising so high in her cabin that her chin touched the ceiling.
The investigator also said the committee reviewed moments from before and during the flooding, including accounts of families and harrowing descriptions of what happened in cabins as water rose. Garrett described a girl clinging to a column with her arms and legs to stay out of the water, and she said one counselor told investigators she pushed girls underwater to get them through the door of a flooded cabin. The committee also saw video of water rushing into a building through cracks in the door, and it watched cellphone video from a stranded camper in which the girl could be heard yelling “Help!” in dark, raging floodwaters.
Garrett repeatedly returned to emergency training as a central element of the committee’s conclusions. “There was never any real training, no drills of any kind,” Garrett said, speaking to lawmakers during the committee’s first hearing focused on the July Fourth flood. She said the camp lacked a detailed evacuation plan and that the only instruction for girls in low-lying areas was a one-paragraph directive telling them to “stay in their cabins unless told otherwise by the office. All cabins are constructed on high, safe locations.”
Garrett said the directive was approved by a state inspector two days before the flood. She told lawmakers that once flooding began, some counselors took matters into their own hands anyway, pushing girls through cabin windows to reach a hill, describing the response as not planned in advance. “It wasn’t a plan. It wasn’t a safe plan, It was an option taken, thank God,” Garrett said. She added that it was “very ad hoc,” and she said some counselors had told their parents before the flood that they were concerned about a lack of training for emergencies.
Lawmakers also heard testimony about how the camp’s leadership and culture shaped decision-making during warnings. Garrett described a “obedience-encouraged” culture dominated by Richard Eastland, whom some camp members of the Eastland family and camp staff referred to as “The General” and “The Eagle.” Garrett said counselors told investigators they feared getting into trouble if they moved children to higher ground or went out into the storm without explicit instructions, and she said the camp relied almost exclusively on Eastland’s direction for what to do in a flood emergency.
During Garrett’s remarks, Sen. Charles Perry told the committee, “The fate of those girls was set before any drop of rain fell.” Perry continued, saying, “The things that were common sense and the things that should have been done, didn’t get done.” Garrett, for her part, described Eastland as a popular camp leader who taught generations of girls how to fish and who had a knack for comforting young campers who were nervous about their first time away from home; she also described him as “running the show over there,” saying, “You just really didn’t cross him.”
Garrett told lawmakers that Eastland’s son, Edward Eastland, testified in a lawsuit last week that any detailed flood evacuation plan was simply inside his father’s head. Family members also told investigators that Richard Eastland was “obsessed” with weather and monitored warnings. Separately, Garrett said Eastland and several girls were found dead in Eastland’s vehicle after he tried to drive them to safety, while Edward Eastland was swept into a tree and camp security officer Glenn Juenke survived despite being trapped in a flooded cabin with campers.
Dozens of victims’ family members attended the hearing, with some sobbing or leaving after photos and names were read. Garrett said the committee’s review laid out a “almost a minute-by-minute” account of flood warnings and communications among Eastland family members, as well as calls for help, and she said that training and an earlier evacuation call likely would have saved every girl, including some who “would have needed to walk just about 20 steps to get to a two-story building.”
Camp Mystic’s owners have said they want to reopen in late May and plan to use only parts of the camp that did not flood. They have said they expect nearly 900 girls on campus this summer, and Garrett’s testimony described how the plan has angered victims’ families. Some prominent state officials have also called for state regulators to deny or delay renewal of Camp Mystic’s license, which is under review, and Garrett’s remarks came as Texas lawmakers had passed new measures last year requiring more detailed planning and training and warning systems for emergencies. The Legislature does not meet again until January 2027, and the panel does not control the review of Camp Mystic’s license.