Two months after the deadliest avalanche in modern California history, avalanche experts are raising questions about decisions made by tour leaders during the Feb. 17 trip near Lake Tahoe, saying the group moved through dangerous terrain more like a single pack than separate risk exposure should allow.
The Sierra Avalanche Center published its analysis Saturday on the National Avalanche Center website, focusing on what the experts said were avoidable safety failures as a group of 15 traveled through a potential avalanche path near Castle Peak during a period of intense snowfall. The report said the skiers were traveling in a tightly packed line when the tour leaders with Blackbird Mountain Guides should have spaced them out to reduce risk.
In the report, the center cited “Exposing only one person at a time to avalanche terrain is an accepted best practice for backcountry travel,” and added that “larger group sizes (4 or more people) have higher chances of being caught in avalanches,” based on analysis of past accidents. The center said the group’s movement through the area occurred after conditions that it described as making a slide likely.
Nine backcountry skiers were killed when a massive wall of snow plunged down a slope near Lake Tahoe, and six others survived, according to the analysis. The center also noted that several members wore avalanche air bag backpacks, but “none of the lifesaving equipment was deployed” during the avalanche.
Blackbird said Monday that an investigation is still ongoing and that the published analysis does not capture all relevant information. In an email, the company said: “The report does not reflect the full scope of what transpired and does not include all of the facts and information currently under review.” The company added it was cooperating with authorities and said it would share more “when it is appropriate and based on verified and confirmed findings.”
The report described how the trip ended abruptly on the last day. It said the avalanche struck as the group chose to end the three-day tour early and leave the huts where they had slept to avoid another impending snowstorm.
To support its assessment, the Sierra Avalanche Center said it relied heavily on accounts from two skiers, Jim Hamilton and Anton Auzans, who survived and spoke to The New York Times about what they saw. The center said both men reported they had taken basic avalanche safety classes and had only been on a handful of backcountry skiing trips before that day. It also said the men described that the guides met behind closed doors and that it was unclear whether they knew about warnings indicating a human-caused avalanche was very likely before the group left the huts.
According to accounts described in the analysis, Hamilton fell behind after struggling to get his boot in his binding before a milelong climb, while 13 skiers—including mostly women—remained bunched behind the lead guides as they crossed avalanche terrain. Auzans said he was just behind that group when the avalanche hit; he was swept away but managed to dig himself out, and moments later Hamilton and a guide reached the spot and tried to unbury people, the report said. The center also cautioned that other survivors may have different details that could provide a more complete picture if they choose to share their stories.
The analysis noted that among the dead were three veteran guides and six women in a close-knit group of friends, and it said Jess Weaver, a spokesperson for that group, reported that the survivors and the families of those who died were not doing interviews at this time. The report said another skier who survived has not spoken publicly.
Avalanche expert Dale Atkins said the group violated a “golden rule” of spreading out during backcountry travel by staying packed together as they moved through an avalanche zone, while also saying it made sense to keep the group together in safer terrain. He added that poor visibility that day and the risk of people getting lost could have influenced the decision to maintain proximity, but he argued the group should not have remained together on the avalanche slope. “Did they mess up? A lot of people will say, ‘Yes,’” Atkins said, adding, “I’m not so sure about that.” He said he suspected the guides “didn’t realize they were in an avalanche path.”
Atkins also commented on the decision to ski out during the storm, saying that in hindsight the skiers should have stayed put until danger lessened, but that guides might have thought leaving quickly was the best option while weather worsened. “A lot of armchair quarterbacks, if they were in the middle of the storm out there, they might have made a similar decision,” Atkins said. “Tragically for these people and their families, there’s no do-over.”
State workplace regulators and the Nevada County Sheriff’s Office are investigating decisions leading up to the avalanche, the analysis said. The avalanche center itself said it has no enforcement powers and that its reports typically provide safety guidance, while the legal inquiries continue into what factors influenced how the group traveled through the mountain terrain.