Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels have so far remained on the sidelines even as Iran’s retaliatory campaign against the United States and Israel with missiles and drones widens across the Middle East, disrupting Gulf trade routes and threatening regional air traffic, analysts say. The pause has raised questions about whether the battle-hardened group will eventually join, and if so, what timing and constraints are shaping its decisions. While other Iran-aligned forces have moved into the conflict, the Houthis have largely confined their role to protests and declarations condemning the Iran war.
Iran’s posture toward new partners has added to the uncertainty. In his first written statement since succeeding his father—who was killed in the opening salvo—Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei suggested on Thursday that Iran may open new fronts in the conflict, a sign analysts said could mean the Houthis get involved soon. Analysts also said Iran’s broader approach appears to rely on gradually adding pressure through partners and capabilities rather than deploying everything at once.
A key factor is the Houthis’ earlier reluctance to fight, which multiple experts attributed to several practical concerns: fears that their leaders could be targeted with assassinations, Yemen’s internal divisions, and uncertainty over the availability and flow of weapons supplies. Ahmed Nagi, a senior Yemen analyst at the International Crisis Group, said that from Tehran’s perspective the Houthis have already proven capable of generating “real pressure,” while he characterized their distance from the conflict as a calculated choice coordinated with Iranian interests.
Nagi and other analysts described the Houthi decision-making as a matter of timing rather than unwillingness. “The decision is not about unwillingness to intervene, but about timing,” he said. He added that Iran’s broader strategy appears to be to avoid revealing all cards at once, using partners and capabilities gradually as the confrontation evolves, and that the Houthis are likely to step in if the conflict widens or if they perceive an existential threat to Iran, including a significant deterioration in Iran’s military capabilities.
On the Houthi side, two officials in the group’s media and political offices told AP that the rebels’ weapons stockpile has been running low after attacks during the Israel-Hamas war. The Iran war has further impeded the flow of weapons, the officials said in anonymous interviews because they were not authorized to talk to the media. Another official told AP that the Houthis still have a large stockpile of drones. Nagi said the group appears to be building up forces by recruiting more fighters, relying on local weapons production, and sending reinforcements to Yemen’s western coastline on the Red Sea, signals he described as preparation for escalation.
If the Houthis join the broader Iran-U.S.-Israel fight, analysts said their most immediate pressure point would likely be attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden—continuing and potentially expanding tactics they used when they launched waves of attacks on Israel and shipping after the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks. Nagi said they could also strike Israel directly and potentially join Iran’s attacks on Gulf countries by targeting U.S. military assets and interests. Nagi said the Houthis’ primary targets would likely be oil tankers, in part because attacking them would both signal escalation and hit energy supply chains.
The AP report also placed the Houthi posture against a backdrop of other Iran-aligned groups moving more quickly. Hezbollah resumed strikes on Israel within two days of the attack on Iran—described as occurring just 15 months after the last Israel-Hezbollah war ended in a November 2024 ceasefire—while militias linked to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed drone strikes on U.S. bases in Irbil. Against that pace, AP reported that the Houthis have instead held protests and issued declarations condemning the Iran war.
Analysts said the question of whether the Houthis will act hinges on both regional and Yemen-specific factors. Abdel-Bari Taher, a political analyst and former head of the press syndicate in Yemen, said any decision to join would be affected by conditions inside Yemen, including deadly clashes in south Yemen, public opposition in Sanaa to joining the war, and increased caution after high-profile assassinations. Taher told AP that Houthi involvement in the conflict “remains a possibility” despite constraints and complex domestic and regional dynamics.
The AP report also said Houthi officials believe U.S. and Israeli pressure is shaping their internal security posture. The officials said the U.S. sent warnings via Omani mediators against participating in the war, and that Houthi political and security leaders were alerted that their cellphones were under surveillance by the U.S. and Israel. The officials said they were concerned about potential Israeli assassinations and that Houthi leaders were instructed not to appear in public. Farea al-Muslimi, a research fellow at Chatham House in London, said the Houthis lack the military capabilities or internal Yemeni interest that would force them to join and that the group appears committed to a U.S. ceasefire brokered by Oman last year.
Despite his view that the Houthis cannot be the first to fire, al-Muslimi said the group hopes to fight, especially with Israel, but “they can’t be the ones to fire the first shot.” He also said the Houthis would likely need a local Yemeni cause to join, a reason he said could strengthen support among their local base. In describing the relationship between the Houthis and Iran, al-Muslimi added that the Houthis are a local group Iran uses and supports but did not create.
Here are related dynamics and prompts the AP report used to frame the Houthis’ position: while Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi has repeatedly emphasized readiness to intervene—claiming their “hands are on the trigger”—analysts said the scope of any involvement remains unclear. They said that if the group escalates, it would likely do so in a way that tightens pressure on Gulf energy routes and potentially expands attacks beyond shipping, but with timing shaped by coordination, weapons constraints, and internal political and security pressures in Yemen.