Trump defense strategy shifts focus from NATO Europe to China

Western Hemisphere

The 2022 strategy emphasized partnership and building regional capacity. The Pentagon stated that “the United States derives immense benefit from a stable, peaceful, and democratic Western Hemisphere that reduces security threats to the homeland” and said “the Department will continue to partner with countries in the region to build capability and promote security and stability.”

The 2026 strategy adopts more assertive language. According to the new document, “We will actively and fearlessly defend America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. We will guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America, and Greenland.”

The strategy adds that the U.S. “will provide President Trump with credible military options to use against narco-terrorists wherever they may be” and pledges that “where they do not” respect shared interests, the U.S. “will stand ready to take focused, decisive action that concretely advances U.S. interests.”

NATO and Russia

The contrast between the two strategies on Russia and European security is stark. The 2022 strategy stated that “the Department will maintain its bedrock commitment to NATO collective security, working alongside Allies and partners to deter, defend, and build resilience against further Russian military aggression and acute forms of gray zone coercion.”

The 2026 document recalibrates that commitment. It states that “Russia will remain a persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern members for the foreseeable future.” The strategy emphasizes the economic disparity between the alliance and Russia, asserting that “European NATO dwarfs Russia in economic scale, population, and, thus, latent military power.” Germany’s economy alone, the document notes, “dwarfs that of Russia.”

The new strategy places primary responsibility for European defense on NATO allies themselves. “Our NATO allies are substantially more powerful than Russia — it is not even close,” the document states, and concludes that “our NATO allies are therefore strongly positioned to take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense, with critical but more limited U.S. support. This includes taking the lead in supporting Ukraine’s defense.”

According to the 2026 strategy, “under President Trump’s leadership, NATO allies have committed to raise defense spending to the new global standard of 5 percent of GDP in total, with 3.5 percent of GDP invested in hard military capabilities.”

China and the Indo-Pacific

China remains central to U.S. strategic thinking in both documents, but the framing differs. The 2022 strategy identified China as “the pacing challenge for the Department” and described it as “the most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security” due to its “coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences.”

The 2026 strategy maintains that containing Chinese dominance is essential. It explains that if China were to dominate the Indo-Pacific region, “it would be able to effectively veto Americans’ access to the world’s economic center of gravity, with enduring implications for our nation’s economic prospects, including our ability to reindustrialize.” The strategic goal, therefore, is to “maintain a favorable balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific.”

However, the new strategy reframes the nature of potential U.S.-China competition. It states that the U.S. objective is “not for purposes of dominating, humiliating, or strangling China. To the contrary, our goal is far more scoped and reasonable than that: It is simply to ensure that neither China nor anyone else can dominate us or our allies.”

Notably, the 2026 strategy suggests diplomatic resolution is possible. “This does not require regime change or some other existential struggle,” the document states. “Rather, a decent peace, on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under, is possible.”

North Korea and South Korea

The strategic shift toward allied burden-sharing is evident in Northeast Asia. The 2022 strategy emphasized U.S. leadership in deterrence, stating the Department “will continue to deter attacks through forward posture; integrated air and missile defense; close coordination and interoperability with our ROK (South Korea) Ally; nuclear deterrence; resilience initiatives; and the potential for direct cost imposition approaches that come from globally deployable Joint Forces.”

The 2026 approach delegates primary responsibility to South Korea. “With its powerful military, supported by high defense spending, a robust defense industry, and mandatory conscription, South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited U.S. support,” the strategy states. The document adds that “South Korea also has the will to do so, given that it faces a direct and clear threat from North Korea.”

Middle East

The pattern of shifting primary responsibility to regional partners extends to the Middle East. The 2022 strategy described plans to “right-size its forward military presence in the Middle East following the mission transition in Afghanistan” while continuing cooperation on Iran deterrence and maritime security.

The 2026 document empowers regional actors more directly. According to the strategy, the Pentagon “will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, including by strongly backing Israel’s efforts to defend itself; deepening cooperation with our Arabian Gulf partners; and enabling integration between Israel and our Arabian Gulf partners, building on President Trump’s historic initiative, the Abraham Accords.”

The strategy notes that “as we do,” the Department “will maintain our ability to take focused, decisive action to defend U.S. interests.”