U.S. ends support for Kurdish forces in Syria, speeding their collapse

The United States withdrew military and diplomatic support from Syria’s Kurdish-led forces in January 2026, allowing the new Syrian government to seize most of their territory in northeast Syria. The shift marked a reversal of years of U.S. backing for the forces, known as the Syrian Democratic Forces, in their battle against the Islamic State. The collapse followed failed negotiations over the forces’ integration into the new army under interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa.

The U.S. decision reflected President Donald Trump’s embrace of al-Sharaa’s government as a strategic partner, with U.S. envoy Tom Barrack saying the SDF’s role as the region’s primary counterterrorism force “has largely expired” since the new government is equipped to assume those duties.

The policy shift

The Syrian Democratic Forces lost most of their territory in northeast Syria during two weeks of January, reversing years of U.S. backing. For years, the Kurdish-led SDF had been the primary partner of the U.S. military against the Islamic State in the region. The shift in American policy was immediate.

After clashes erupted in Aleppo on January 6 between SDF forces and the Syrian military, the U.S. did not intervene. Instead, Washington focused on mediating a ceasefire between the two sides, signaling its shift toward the new Syrian government.

Elham Ahmad, a senior official with the Kurdish-led administration, told journalists that calls for U.S.-led coalition intervention against the Islamic State “have gone unanswered.”

Why the U.S. changed course

President Donald Trump has strongly backed the government of interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former insurgent leader whose forces ousted former President Bashar Assad in December 2024. Under al-Sharaa, Syria has joined the global coalition against the Islamic State.

“It’s been very clear for months that the U.S. views Damascus as a potential strategic partner,” said Noah Bonsey, senior advisor on Syria with the International Crisis Group.

U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack made the shift explicit in a statement released Tuesday. The SDF’s role as Syria’s primary counterterrorism force “has largely expired” since the new government is “both willing and positioned to take over security responsibilities,” Barrack said. The U.S. is not interested in “prolonging a separate SDF role,” he said.

By Wednesday, the U.S. military started transferring Islamic State detainees from northeastern Syria to secure facilities in Iraq, a physical manifestation of the policy change.

How the integration talks collapsed

The integration of SDF forces into the new Syrian army had been in the works for months. In March 2025, Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi agreed that the SDF’s tens of thousands of fighters would be integrated into the new army. The government would also take over key institutions in northeast Syria, including border crossings, oil fields, and detention centers housing thousands of suspected Islamic State members.

For months, U.S.-mediated negotiations to implement the deal stalled. Syrian government officials blamed the SDF for fractured leadership and maximalist demands.

Syria’s ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim Olabi, said Abdi had on several occasions agreed to proposals that the group’s more hardline leaders then rejected.

The disagreements ran deep. The SDF’s Kurdish base was wary of the new government, particularly after outbreaks of sectarian violence targeting other minority groups in Syria.

“There was a major disagreement over a huge substantive set of questions around the future of Syrian governance, how decentralized or centralized it should be,” Bonsey said.

Meghan Bodette, director of research at the Kurdish Peace Institute, said the impasse came down to an “astronomical” gulf in political outlook.

“Damascus comes from an Islamist background and sought to create a centralized, Sunni Arab-dominated state, while the Kurdish-led authorities wanted to keep maximum local autonomy,” Bodette said.

Much of the negotiations focused on how the SDF forces would actually be integrated. The government proposed keeping the SDF unified in three battalions in northeastern Syria along with a border brigade, a women’s brigade, and a special forces brigade.

The government demanded that non-SDF military forces have freedom of movement in the northeast and that SDF divisions report to the Ministry of Defense and not move without orders. Mazloum Abdi asked to be named deputy minister of defense, and the government agreed.

But at the last negotiation session in early January, SDF commander Sipan Hamo—seen by Damascus as part of the hardline faction—made a new demand: the northeast brigades and battalions would report to a person chosen by the SDF, and other forces could only enter the region in small patrols and with SDF permission.

The government rejected that position.

The military outcome

Days after that session, clashes erupted in Aleppo. The Syrian military’s success in limiting civilian casualties proved to be a turning point.

The military opened “humanitarian corridors” so civilians could flee. After Syrian forces captured the Arab-majority oil-rich provinces of Raqqa and Deir al-Zour from the SDF, the two sides announced a deal.

The SDF would retain a presence only in Hassakeh province, the country’s Kurdish heartland. SDF fighters would be integrated into the army as individuals rather than as units.

“They ended up accepting a deal that is much worse than what was on offer just two weeks ago,” Bonsey said of the SDF’s position.